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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with
failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games
to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents
share a common set of facilities (service providers), where
each service provider (SP) may fail with some known proba-
bility. For reliability reasons, an agent may choose a subset
of the SPs in order to try and perform his task. The cost of
an agent for utilizing any SP is a function of the total num-
ber of agents using this SP. A main feature of this setting
is that the cost for an agent for successful completion of his
task is the minimum of the costs of his successful attempts.
We show that although BCGFs do not admit a potential
function, and thus are not isomorphic to classic congestion
games, they always possess a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium. We also show that the SPs’ congestion experienced
in di erent Nash equilibria is (almost) unique. For the sub-
class of symmetric BCGFs we give a characterization of best
and worst Nash equilibria. We extend the basic model by
making task submission costly and deﬁne a model for taxed
CGFs (TCGFs). We prove the existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium for quasi-symmetric TCGFs, and present
an e cient algorithm for constructing such Nash equilibrium
in symmetric TCGFs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed
Systems; I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Ar-
tiﬁcial Intelligence —multiagent systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Theory, Economics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rosenthal [11] introduced the class of congestion games
and proved that they always possess a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies. Congestion games are noncooperative
games in which a collection of agents have to choose from a
ﬁnite set of alternatives (facilities). The utility of an agent
from using a particular facility depends only on the number
of agents using it, and his total utility is the sum of the util-
ities obtained from the facilities he uses. Congestion games
have been used to model tra c behavior in road and commu-
nication networks, competition among ﬁrms for production
processes, migration of animals between di erent habitats,
and received a lot of attention in the recent computer sci-
ence and electronic commerce communities [6, 8, 10, 11, 13].
Rosenthal [11] studied games with a ﬁnite number of play-
ers. In addition, several authors have considered nonatomic
congestion games with a continuum of players [6, 12].
However, the above settings do not take into considera-
tion the possibility that facilities may fail to execute their
assigned tasks. Typically, the facilities are machines, com-
puters, service providers, communication lines etc. These
kinds of facilities are obviously prone to failures because of
breakage or for any other reasons. Thus, the issue of failures
should not be ignored.
The notion of failures originates from the ﬁeld of dis-
tributed systems. In a lot of situations failing components
of the system may be viewed as playing against its correctly
functioning parts. The issue of failures in game-theoretic
setting is extensively discussed in [4]. In another line of re-
search, Porter et. al. [9] introduced the notion of fault tol-
erant mechanism design which extends the standard game-
theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for un-
certain executions. In the above settings failing components
are self-motivated or malicious agents. In our work we ini-
tiate an investigation of failures in congestion games, where
not the agents, but the facilities they share may fail.
As it turns out, such failures have signiﬁcant implications
on agent behavior, as illustrated by the following simple
example. Consider a reliable network with two nodes s and
t, and two parallel links. Assume an agent wishes to send
a message from s to t. Then, he would send the message
along one of the links. However, if the network links are not
reliable then, for reliability reasons, the agent may decide to
send his message along both links.
Suppose now that n agents share a reliable network with
two parallel links, where the cost associated with each link
is a (nondecreasing) function l(x) of the congestion experi-
enced by this link. Each agent has to send a message froms to t, and his aim is to minimize his own cost. If n is even,
then in an equilibrium, half of the agents would take one link
and the other half would use the second link, and thus the
cost to each agent is l
` n
2
´
. If the network links are not reli-
able, the agents might send a message along both links. As
a result of such behavior, the network might be overloaded,
and the cost to each agent will be very high. Therefore,
each agent wants to maximize the probability of successful
delivery of his message and, simultaneously, to minimize his
cost.
The above example illustrates the need for a careful study
of the e ects of failures in congestion settings. In order
to address this challenge, we introduce a model for conges-
tion games with failures (CGFs), and establish several basic
results for this model. To the best of our knowledge, no
attempt has been made so far to incorporate the issue of
failures into congestion settings.
We begin by deﬁning a basic model for congestion games
with failures (BCGFs). In a BCGF agents share a com-
mon set of facilities (service providers), where each service
provider (SP) may fail with some known probability. For re-
liability reasons, an agent may choose a subset of the service
providers in order to try and perform his task. Therefore,
each agent’s set of pure strategies coincide with the power
set of the set of SPs, and the total load on the system is not
known in advance, but strategy-dependent. The cost for an
agent for successful completion of his task is the minimum of
the costs of his successful attempts. The cost function asso-
ciated with each SP is not universal but agent-speciﬁc. That
is, the utility to an agent depends not only on the number
of agents using the same SP, but also on the identity of the
agent in question. Congestion games with agent-speciﬁc cost
functions were ﬁrst studied by Milchtaich [5]. This general-
ization was, however, accompanied by the assumption that
each agent chooses only one facility.
Our ﬁrst result is that, although BCGFs do not admit a
potential function, and thus are not isomorphic to classic
congestion games, they always possess a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. We also show that the SPs’ congestion expe-
rienced in di erent Nash equilibria is (almost) unique. For
the subclass of symmetric BCGFs we give a characteriza-
tion of best and worst Nash equilibria with respect to the
social disutility, present algorithms for their construction,
and compare the social disutilities of the agents at these
points.
We also consider the worst possible ratio between the so-
cial disutilities incurred by agents in an equilibrium and in
an optimal outcome. This ratio (dubbed ”the price of anar-
chy”) was proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3] as
a measure of the ine ciency of selﬁsh behavior in noncoop-
erative systems, and was extensively studied for nonatomic
congestion games [2, 13, 12]. We show that in congestion
games with failures the price of anarchy depends on the pa-
rameters of the game and cannot be bounded by a constant
value, even for very simple (e.g., linear) cost functions.
A natural extension of the basic model is obtained by mak-
ing task submission costly. There are two motivations for
considering this setting: service providers may demand some
ﬁxed payment (cost) for task submission, or we can think
about taxes that can be imposed by some central coordina-
tor in order to achieve better social results. We deﬁne the
taxed congestion games with failures (TCGFs) model which
is obtained from the basic model by incorporating taxes as
follows: each agent pays a ﬁxed cost/tax for using each of
the service providers he had chosen. Our main technical
result is the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in quasi-symmetric TCGFs. In a quasi-symmetric TCGF
service costs are facility-dependent. Our proof is construc-
tive and yields an e cient procedure for constructing such
equilibria in these games. In addition, we develop a simpler
algorithm for constructing Nash equilibrium in the special
case of symmetric TCGFs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne
our basic model. In Section 3 we show that BCGFs do not
admit a potential. In Section 4 we provide a (constructive)
proof of the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
BCGFs and consider its uniqueness properties. Section 5
is devoted to symmetric BCGFs. We characterize the best
and worst Nash equilibria in symmetric BCGFs, present al-
gorithms for their construction and provide an upper bound
on the ratio between them. We also discuss the ratio be-
tween the social disutility in a Nash equilibrium and the op-
timal social disutility in these games. In Section 6 we deﬁne
taxed congestion games with failures, and (constructively)
prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for
quasi-symmetric TCGFs. We also provide an e cient proce-
dure for computing Nash equilibrium in symmetric TCGFs.
Some proofs are omitted from this paper due to lack of space
and will appear in the full version.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
A basic CGF (BCGF) is deﬁned as follows. Let N =
{1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of agents, and let E = {1,...,m}
be a ﬁnite nonempty set of independent service providers,
each associated with a failure probability. Each agent has a
task which can be carried out by any of the service providers.
Agent i’s disutility from an uncompleted task is evaluated
by his incompletion cost (denoted by Wi). The service cost
(denoted by l
i
e) for agent i for utilizing service provider e
consists of an execution cost (denoted by b
i
e) and a ﬁxed
completion cost (denoted by a).
1 The disutility  i of agent
i from a combination of strategies (one for each agent) is
the expectation of the sum of his incompletion and service
costs, where the service cost for an agent is the minimum
of the service costs of the SPs he has chosen which did not
fail. This is deﬁned more precisely below.
The success probability of e   E is denoted by se (0 < se <
1). Similarly, fe = 1 se stands for the failure probability of
e. The set of pure strategies  i for agent i   N is the power
set of the set of SPs:  i = P(E), and the set of pure-strategy
proﬁles is deﬁned to be   =  1   ···    n = [P(E)]
n.
Let   = ( 1,..., n)     be a combination of pure strate-
gies. The (|E|-dimensional) congestion vector that corre-
sponds to   is h
  = (h
 
e)e E, where h
 
e =
˛
˛{i   N|e    i}
˛
˛.
The execution cost of service provider e for agent i is a func-
tion b
i
e :     R of the congestion experienced by e. The
disutility function of agent i,  i :     R, is deﬁned as fol-
lows. If agent i chooses strategy  i =   (i.e., does not assign
his task to any service provider) then his disutility equals his
incompletion cost,  i( ) = Wi. For any strategy  i  =   of
1This models for example a payment to the network admin-
istrator for successful execution of a task, by one or more
of the service providers. Our model can be extended, while
leading to similar results, to the case where the completion
cost is agent-dependent or facility dependent.agent i,
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Y
e  i
fe +
X
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where a is the ﬁxed completion cost, b
i
e(h
 
e) is the execution
cost of service provider e for agent i, when its congestion
is h
 
e, and the sum of execution and ﬁxed completion costs
l
i
e(h
 
e) = b
i
e(h
 
e) + a is the service cost of service provider e
for agent i.
We assume that b
i
e(·) is a nonnegative nondecreasing func-
tion satisfying b
i
e(x)   Wi for all i   N, e   E and integer
0   x   n. This means that the execution of a task does
not cost more than its failure. W.l.o.g., we also assume that
for any agent i his incompletion cost Wi is larger than the
ﬁxed completion cost a. Otherwise, the obvious dominant
strategy of agent i is to avoid assigning his task to any ser-
vice provider. Note that for all 0   x   n, b
i
e(x)   Wi and
a   Wi, but l
i
e(x) might be larger than Wi. Obviously, if
l
i
e(1) > Wi for all e   E, the dominant strategy of agent i
is to avoid assigning a task, i.e. in this case agent i can be
actually ignored. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we assume that such
cases do not take place.
3. THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A
POTENTIAL IN BCGFS
Monderer and Shapley [7] introduced the notion of po-
tential function and deﬁned a potential game to be a game
which possesses a potential function. A potential function is
a real-valued function over the set of pure-strategy proﬁles,
with the property that the gain (or loss) of an agent shifting
to another strategy while keeping the other agents’ strate-
gies unchanged is equal to the corresponding increment of
the potential function. The authors showed that the classes
of potential games and congestion games coincide.
In this section we show that the class of BCGFs does not
possess a potential function, and therefore is not isomor-
phic to the class of congestion games. We show that even
agent-symmetric BCGFs do not admit a potential function.
Hence, the non-existence of a potential in BCGFs is a re-
sult of allowing facility failures. To prove this statement we
employ Theorem 3.1 of Monderer and Shapley [7]. First,
however, we need to present some deﬁnitions.
A path in   is a sequence   = ( 
0    
1   ···) such
that for every k   1 there exists a unique player, say player
i, such that  
k = ( 
k 1
 i ,x) for some x  =  
k 1
i in  i.  
0
is called the initial point of  , and if   is ﬁnite, then its
last element is called the terminal point of  . A ﬁnite path
  = ( 
0    
1   ···    
K) is closed if  
0 =  
K. It
is a simple closed path if in addition  
l  =  
k for every
0   l  = k   K   1. The length of a simple closed path
is deﬁned to be the number of distinct points in it; that is,
the length of   = ( 
0    
1   ···    
K) is K. For a
ﬁnite path   = ( 
0    
1   ···    
K) and for a vector
U = (U1,...,Un) of utility functions, let us deﬁne
U( ) =
K X
k=1
[Uik( 
k)   Uik( 
k 1)],
where ik is the unique deviator at step k. Then,
Theorem 3.1. (Monderer—Shapley, [7]) Let   be a
game in strategic form. Then,   is a potential game if and
only if U( ) = 0 for every ﬁnite simple closed path   of
length 4.
By this theorem, if   is a game in strategic form with Ui :
    R the utility function of agent i, then   is a potential
game if and only if for every i,j   N, for every z     {i,j},
and for every xi,yi    i and xj,yj    j,
Ui( )   Ui( ) + Uj( )   Uj( ) +
Ui( )   Ui( ) + Uj( )   Uj( ) = 0,
where   = (xi,xj,z),   = (yi,xj,z),   = (yi,yj,z),   =
(xi,yj,z) (thus,                   is a simple closed
path of length 4).
Proposition 3.2. The class of BCGFs does not possess
a potential function.
Proof: A counterexample is the following symmetric game
G in which two agents (N = {1,2}) wish to assign a task to
two independent SPs (E = {e1,e2}). The failure probability
f of each SP is positive (f > 0). The failure cost to each of
the agents is W   2, and the service cost function of each SP
to each agent is given by l
i
e(x) = min{x,W}+a ( e,i). Con-
sider the simple closed path of length 4 which is formed by
  = ( ,{e2}),   = ({e1},{e2}),   = ({e1},{e1,e2}),   =
( ,{e1,e2}) :
 1( ) = W; 2( ) = fW + (1   f)(min{1,W} + a);
 1( ) =  2( ) = fW + (1   f)(min{1,W} + a);
 1( ) = fW + (1   f)(min{2,W} + a); 2( ) = f
2W
+(1   f)(min{1,W} + a) + f(1   f)(min{2,W} + a);
 1( ) = W; 2( ) = f
2W + (1   f
2)(min{1,W} + a).
Then,
 1( )    1( ) +  2( )    2( ) +  1( )    1( )
+ 2( )    2( ) =  (1   f)
2  = 0.
Then, by Theorem 3.1, congestion games with failures do
not possess a potential function.  
4. PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA
IN BCGFS
By Monderer and Shapley [7], every ﬁnite potential game
possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We have shown
in Section 3 that BCGFs do not admit a potential function,
but this fact, in general, does not contradict the existence of
an equilibrium in pure strategies. In this section we prove
that all basic congestion games with failures possess a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies, and present an e cient algo-
rithm that ﬁnds such equilibrium points in a given BCGF.
Moreover, we show that di erent Nash equilibrium proﬁles
of a given BCGF correspond to (almost) the same conges-
tion vector.
4.1 Existence and construction
We present below our ﬁrst theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Congestion games with failures possess a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.One point to notice is that the proof is constructive and
makes use of the following e cient simple algorithm for ﬁnd-
ing a pure Nash equilibrium in a given BCGF.
4.1.1 NE-algorithm
Initiali-
zation: For all 1   i   n, set  i :=  ;
Main For all e   E:
step: (1) Sort the agents in a non-increasing
order of
x
i
e = max{x|Wi > l
i
e(x), x = 0,1,...,n};
Let  e : N   {1,...,n}
i    ie =  e(i)
be the corresponding permutation
function;
(2) For ie = 1 to n:
if ie   x
i
e, then  i :=  i   {e}.
4.2 (Almost) uniqueness
We consider uniqueness properties of Nash equilibria in
BCGFs. We restrict our attention to games with strictly
increasing service cost functions, and show that in such
BCGFs the di erence between the congestion experienced
by any SP in two di erent Nash equilibria is bounded by 1.
Let NE     be a set of Nash equilibrium pure-strategy
combinations, and let hM represent the maximal congestion
that may be experienced by any service provider at any Nash
equilibrium, i.e. hM = max{h
 
e|e   E,     NE}. Then,
Proposition 4.2. If for all e   E and i   N, l
i
e(x)
is a strictly increasing monotone function on the interval
0   x   hM, then for any pair of Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁles  
1, 
2   NE the inequality |h
 1
e  h
 2
e |   1 holds for
all e   E.
For the proof of Proposition 4.2 we need the following claim.
Claim 4.3. Let     NE be a Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁle. Then, for all i   N,
(i) l
i
e(h
 
e)   Wi,  e    i;
(ii) l
i
e(h
 
e + 1)   Wi,  e /    i.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Let  
1, 
2   NE be Nash
equilibrium strategy proﬁles, and assume that h
 1
e > h
 2
e +1
for some e   E. Then, there is an agent i such that e    
1
i ,
but e /    
2
i . By Claim 4.3, for agent i we have l
i
e(h
 1
e )   Wi
and l
i
e(h
 2
e + 1)   Wi. Therefore, l
i
e(h
 1
e )   l
i
e(h
 2
e + 1).
Now, h
 1
e > h
 2
e + 1 coupled with the monotonicity of l
i
e(x)
lead to l
i
e(h
 1
e ) > l
i
e(h
 2
e + 1), in contradiction to l
i
e(h
 1
e )  
l
i
e(h
 2
e + 1).  
It is easy to show that if in addition to the requirements of
Proposition 4.2, the cost function l
i
e(·) satisﬁes l
i
e(x)  = Wi
for 0   x   hM, then all Nash equilibria of a given BCGF
correspond to the same congestion vector, i.e. the congestion
of any SP is ﬁxed for all equilibrium points. In particular,
all generic BCGFs have this uniqueness property.
5. SYMMETRIC BCGFS
In this subsection we give some additional characteriza-
tion of Nash equilibria in symmetric BCGFs. In symmetric
BCGFs, the agents and the SPs are symmetric, i.e. for all
i = 1,...,n and e   E we have Wi = W, fe = f, and
l
i
e(x) = l(x), for all x   {0,1,...,n}. We also present e -
cient algorithms for ﬁnding best and worst Nash equilibria,
and make a comparison between this equilibria.
Proposition 5.1. Let G be a symmetric BCGF. If l(x)
is a strictly increasing monotone function on the interval
0   x   hM, then at any Nash equilibrium     NE(G),
the di erence between the congestions of di erent SPs is
bounded by 1, i.e. for all     NE and for all a,b   E,
the inequality |h
 
a   h
 
b|   1 holds.
5.1 Best and worst equilibria
Given a strategy proﬁle  , deﬁne the social disutility  ( )
as the sum of the agents’ disutilities in this strategy pro-
ﬁle:  ( ) =
P
i N  i( ). A strategy proﬁle that minimizes
the social disutility over the set of strategy proﬁles is called
a social optimum. A best (worst) equilibrium is a strategy
proﬁle that minimizes (maximizes) the social disutility over
the set of equilibrium strategies. The social disutility in a
best equilibrium describes the best result that can be ob-
tained in a system with noncooperative selﬁsh agents. The
ratio between the social disutilities in a worst equilibrium
and in a social optimum serves as a measure of the ine -
ciency of Nash equilibrium. In this subsection we character-
ize, construct and compare best and worst Nash equilibria
in symmetric BCGFs.
Proposition 5.2. Let h
  = max{x|l(x) < W}. Then,
there is a best Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle   in which
the congestion on each e   E is h
 
e = h
 , and moreover, ˛
˛| i|   | j|
˛
˛   1 for all i,j   N.
We prove below that the following algorithm (5.1.1), which
is a (modiﬁed) version of the NE-algorithm (4.1.1), ﬁnds a
best pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the properties de-
scribed by Proposition 5.2, in a given symmetric BCGF.
5.1.1 BNE-algorithm
Initiali-
zation: For all 1   i   n, set  i :=  ;
Main For all e   E:
step: (1) Sort the agents in an order
 e : N   {1,...,n}
i    ie =  e(i)
satisfying the following condition:
for all i,j   N,
| i| < | j|   ie =  e(i) <  e(j) = je;
(2) Let
xmax = max{x|W > l(x), x = 0,1,...,n};
For ie = 1 to n:
if ie   xmax, then  i :=  i   {e}.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: By Theorem 4.1, the com-
bination of strategies constructed by BNE-algorithm is a
Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle. One can check that the
resulting combination of strategies satisﬁes the conditions
of Proposition 5.2. More precisely, x agents choose  
mh 
n  
service providers, where m denote the number of SPs, and
y agents choose  
mh 
n   + 1 service providers, where x and y
satisfy the following equation:
 
x 
mh 
n   + y( 
mh 
n   + 1) = mh
 
x + y = n.The values of x and y are
x = n
„
 
mh
 
n
  + 1
«
  mh
  ;
y = mh
    n 
mh
 
n
 . (2)
Note that if n divides mh
 , then x = n, y = 0. To complete
the proof we need the following two claims.
Claim 5.3. Let     NE be a combination of strategies at
Nash equilibrium with two agents i,j   N, such that | i| >
| j| + 1. Then, the combination of strategies
ˆ   = ( 1,..., i   {b},..., j   {b},..., n),
where b   argmaxe  i  j l(h
 
e), is better than  , i.e. Pn
k=1  k(ˆ  )  
Pn
k=1  k( ).
Claim 5.4. Let    = (E,...,E) be a Nash equilibrium
strategy proﬁle and let i be an agent playing  i  = E. Then,
for all k   N and for all e   E    i,
 k( )    k( 1,..., i   {e},..., n).
By Claims 5.3 and 5.4, the combination of strategies con-
structed by the BNE-algorithm is a best Nash equilibrium
proﬁle.  
The BNE-algorithm provides an e cient procedure for
constructing best Nash equilibria in symmetric BCGFs, as
deﬁned in Proposition 5.2. Next we identify some worst
equilibria in symmetric BCGFs. These equilibrium points
have very simple form and can be easily constructed, as fol-
lows from the next proposition.
Proposition 5.5. Let h
   = argmax{x|l(x)   W}. Then,
there is a worst Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle   in which
exactly h
   agents play E, n   h
   agents play   and h
 
e =
h
   for all e   E.
Next we compare the best and the worst Nash equilibria.
Let us denote the social disutility of a best Nash equilibrium
strategy proﬁle by  B, and the worst one by  W:
 W = h
   (Wf
m + l(h
  )(1   f
m)) + (n   h
  )W
= h
  (1   f
m)(l(h
  )   W) + nW; (3)
 B = x
“
Wf
  mh 
n   + l(h
 )(1   f
  mh 
n  )
”
+y
“
Wf
  mh 
n  +1 + l(h
 )(1   f
  mh 
n  +1)
”
= f
  mh 
n  (x + fy)(W   l(h
 )) + nl(h
 ), (4)
where x and y are given by (2).
Therefore, the ratio between social disutilities in worst
and best equilibria is
 W
 B
=
h
  (1   f
m)(l(h
  )   W) + nW
f  mh 
n  (x + fy)(W   l(h )) + nl(h )
. (5)
Since l(h
 ) < W and l(h
  )   W, we have that
 W
 B
<
nW
nl(h )
=
W
l(h )
. (6)
This implies that the values of the social disutility in di er-
ent Nash equilibrium points lie in a very narrow range. In
the context of social performance of Nash equilibria, one has
to ask how far these values are from the social optimum.
5.2 Nash equilibria and social optimum
In this subsection we discuss the social performance of
Nash equilibrium in BCGFs. By Ashlagi [1], a best equilib-
rium strategy proﬁle in classic congestion games with mono-
tone concave cost functions is socially optimal. Simple ex-
amples (that were omitted from this paper) show that in
BCGFs with such cost functions, best equilibrium strategy
proﬁles are not always socially optimal.
Furthermore, we show below that in BCGFs the price of
anarchy (the ratio between social disutilities in a worst Nash
equilibrium and a social optimum) depends on the parame-
ters of the game and cannot be bounded by a constant value,
even for very simple (e.g., linear) cost functions.
Consider the following example. Suppose we have n   2
agents sharing the set E = {1,...,m} of m   2 independent
SPs. Each service provider e   E has the failure probability
f, and the service cost of each SP for each agent is l(x) =
min{x,W} + a, where a is a ﬁxed completion cost. The
failure cost of each agent is W = n + a.
The worst Nash equilibrium in this case corresponds to
the combination of strategies   in which each agent chooses
to use each of the SPs. The disutility of agent i, i   N, at
this point is
 i( ) = f
mW + (1   f
m)(min{x,W} + a) (7)
= f
m(n + a) + (1   f
m)(n + a) = n + a,
and the social disutility is
 ( ) =
n X
i=1
 i( ) = n(n + a). (8)
Consider the combination of strategies ˆ   that corresponds
to the following agents’ behavior: each agent chooses only
one SP and the agents divide up the SPs in a uniform way,
i.e. each SP is chosen by
n
m agents (assume m divides n).
The disutility of agent i, i   N, at this point is
 i(ˆ  ) = fW + (1   f)
“
min{
n
m
,W} + a
”
(9)
= f(n + a) + (1   f)
“ n
m
+ a
”
= fn + (1   f)
n
m
+ a,
and the social disutility is
 (ˆ  ) =
n X
i=1
 i(ˆ  ) = n
“
fn + (1   f)
n
m
+ a
”
. (10)
Then, the ratio between outcomes of the worst Nash equi-
librium and the social optimum is
 ( )
 (OPT)
 
 ( )
 (ˆ  )
=
n(n + a)
n
`
fn + (1   f)
n
m + a
´ (11)
=
n + a
fn + (1   f)
n
m + a
=
m(n + a)
fmn + (1   f)n + am
f 0
>
m(n + a)
n + am
a 0
>
mn
n
= m. (12)
This implies that the price of anarchy in congestion games
with failures, unlike in classic congestion games, is not bounded
by a constant value, but is game-dependent.6. TAXED CONGESTION GAMES WITH
FAILURES
A natural extension of the basic model is obtained by
making task submission costly. We deﬁne the taxed conges-
tion games with failures (TCGFs) model which is obtained
from the basic model by incorporating ﬁxed costs/taxes as
follows: each agent pays a ﬁxed cost/tax for using each of
the service providers he had chosen. The disutility of an
agent equals the sum of his disutility in the corresponding
BCGF and the sum of taxes over the set of SPs selected
by this agent. Let te be a ﬁxed cost/tax for using service
provider e. Then, the disutility of agent i is given by
 
TCGF
i ( ) =  
BCGF
i ( ) +
X
e  i
te. (13)
Since BCGF is a special case of a TCGF, we can easily
conclude that the class of taxed congestion games with fail-
ures does not admit a potential function. Nevertheless, in
the following subsection we prove the existence of a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium for quasi-symmetric TCGFs as
deﬁned below, and develop a procedure for obtaining such
equilibrium.
6.1 Theexistenceofapure-strategyNashequi-
librium in quasi-symmetric TCGFs
A quasi-symmetric TCGF is a TCGF in which service
costs are not agent-speciﬁc ( e   E,i   N,l
i
e(·) = le(·)),
and taxes and failure probabilities of all service providers
are identical ( e   E,te = t,fe = f). Notice that in TCGFs
service costs can be facility-dependent.
We now present our main technical result.
Theorem 6.1. Every quasi-symmetric TCGF possesses a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
We say that a strategy proﬁle is stable if there are no
agents who wish to unilaterally drop an SP or exchange it for
another one. We denote the set of all stable strategy proﬁles
by  
0, and note that ( ,..., ) lies in  
0. Note that a stable
strategy proﬁle for which no agent would like to unilaterally
add an SP to his strategy set is a Nash equilibrium. This
leads us to prove the theorem by constructing an iterative
algorithm having the following properties:
• The input and the output of each iteration of the al-
gorithm lie in  
0.
• The congestion of each service provider e   E can only
increase as the algorithm proceeds.
• The algorithm reaches a Nash equilibrium point after
a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Given      
0, the algorithm selects, in a way described
below, an agent iadd who wishes to add an SP to his strategy
set. If after this addition the system is not stable, then a
stabilization step closes this iteration of the process. We
show that a Nash equilibrium is achieved if we initialize the
iteration sequence using the empty strategy proﬁle.
6.1.1 TNE-algorithm
Initiali- For all i   N, set  i :=  ;
zation: For all e   E set he := 0;
Main (1) Set ¯ E := {e   E|he < n};
step: (2) Order ¯ E according to the rule
x   y   lx(hx + 1)   ly(hy + 1);
(3) For all i   N, set ei := min{x|x /    i};
(4) If for all i   N,
 i( 1,..., i   {ei},..., n) >  i( ),
then QUIT. Otherwise, go to (5);
(5) Set ¯ N := {i   N| i( )  
 i( 1,..., i   {ei},..., n)};
(6) Set emin := min{ei|i   ¯ N};
(7) Set iadd := min{i|ei = emin};
 iadd :=  iadd   {emin};
hemin := hemin + 1;
(8) If ( 1,..., iadd   {emin},..., n)    
0,
then go to (1). Otherwise, go to (9);
(9) Set e N := {i   N| i( ) >
 i( 1,..., i   {emin},..., n)
   u   ¯ E    i :  i( ) >
 i( 1,...,( i   {emin})   {u},..., n)};
(10) Set idrop := min{i|i   e N};
(11) Set  idrop :=  idrop   {emin};
hemin := hemin   1, and go to (3).
Each iteration of the above algorithm begins from a sta-
ble strategy set   with its congestion vector h. First, the
algorithm sorts the set of all e   E with he < n in the
non-decreasing order of le(he + 1). For each agent i, let ei
be the smallest SP which is not included in the strategy set
of i, according to the above order. If a unilateral addition
of an SP to the strategy set of i does not deteriorate his
payo , then the most appropriate additional SP for agent
i is ei. If no agent wishes to change his strategy in this
manner, we declare   is a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle
and quit the algorithm. Otherwise, let ¯ N denote the set
of agents who wish to add an SP to their strategy set, and
let emin = min{ei
˛
˛i   ¯ N}. The algorithm selects from ¯ N
an agent iadd := min{i
˛
˛ei = emin}, and adds the service
provider emin to his strategy set. If the resulting strategy
proﬁle  
  is stable, the algorithm proceeds to the next it-
eration. Otherwise, we need to stabilize  
 . We need the
following lemma:
Lemma 6.2. Let      
0 and let  
  be obtained from   by
adding agent i to service provider x. Then, for all j   N
and z    
 
j   {x}:
(i)  j( 
 )    j( 
 
1,..., 
 
j   {z},..., 
 
n);
(ii)  j( 
 )    j( 
 
1,...,( 
 
j   {z})   {y},..., 
 
n), where
y   E    
 
j.
Proof: If j = i, then the proof is immediate.
Consider j  = i. Since   is a stable strategy proﬁle,
 j( )    j( 1,..., j   {z},..., n).Then,
Wjf
| j| +
X
A P( j)
min
e A
le(he)s
|A|f
| j| |A| + | j|t
  Wjf
| j| 1 + (14)
X
B P( j {z})
min
e B
le(he)s
|B|f
| j| |B| 1 + (| j|   1)t,
where P(S) represent the set of all nonempty subsets of S,
for any set S: P(S) = P(S)   { }.
For every pair of sets S,Q, the next equality holds:
P(S) = P(S   Q)   P(S   Q)   (15)
˘
     
˛
˛    P(S   Q),    P(S   Q)
¯
.
By (14) and (15) with S =  j, Q =  j   {z},
Wjf
| j| + f
X
B P( j {z})
min
e B
le(he)s
|B|f
| j| |B| 1
+s
X
B P( j {z})
min
e B {z}
le(he)s
|B|f
| j| |B| 1
+lz(hz)sf
| j| 1 + t (16)
  Wjf
| j| 1 +
X
B P( j {z})
min
e B
le(he)s
|B|f
| j| |B| 1
  (1   f)
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(he)   min
e B
le(he)
«
 s
|B|f
| j| |B| 1
  (1   f)(Wj   lz(hz))f
| j| 1   t
 
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(he)   min
e B
le(he)
«
s
|B|f
 |B|
  Wj   lz(hz)  
t
(1   f)f| j| 1. (17)
By contrary, assume that adding agent i to service provider
x causes agent j to drop service provider z  = x. Then, by
step (9) of the TNE-algorithm,
 j( 
 ) =  j( 1,..., i   {x},..., j ..., n)
>  j( 1,..., i   {x},..., j   {z}..., n)
=  j( 
 
1,..., 
 
i,..., 
 
j   {z}..., 
 
n).
That is,
Wjf
| j| +
X
A P( j)
min
e A
le(h
x
e)s
|A||f
 j| |A| + | j|t
> Wjf
| j| 1 +
X
B P( j {z})
min
e B
le(h
x
e)s
|B|f
| j| |B| 1
+(| j|   1)t, (18)
where for all v   ¯ E, h
v
e is deﬁned to be
h
v
e =
 
he e  = v;
he + 1 e = v. (19)
From (18), by (15) we get
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(h
x
e)   min
e B
le(h
x
e)
«
s
|B|f
 |B|
> Wj   lz(hz)  
t
(1   f)f| j| 1. (20)
By (19) and the monotonicity of le(·), for any B   P( j  
{z}) we have
min
e B {z}
le(h
x
e)   min
e B
le(h
x
e)   min
e B {z}
le(he)   min
e B
le(he).
Then, by (17),
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(h
x
e)   min
e B
le(h
x
e)
«
s
|B|f
 |B|
 
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(he)   min
e B
le(he)
«
s
|B|f
 |B|
  Wj   lz(hz)  
t
(1   f)f| j| 1, (21)
in contradiction to (20).
Now assume that adding agent i to service provider x
causes agent j to deviate from service provider z  = x to
service provider y. Then,
 j( 
 ) =  j( 1,..., i   {x},..., j,..., n)
= Wjf
| j| +
X
A P( j)
min
e A
le(h
x
e)s
|A|f
| j| |A|
+| j|t > Wjf
| j| + | j|t (22)
+
X
C P(( j {z}) {y})
min
e C
le(h
x,y
e )s
|C|f
| j| |C|
=  j( 1,..., i   {x},...,( j   {z})   {y},..., n)
=  j( 
 
1,..., 
 
i,...,( 
 
j   {z})   {y},..., 
 
n).
From (22), by (15) with S =  j, Q =  j   {z} for the left
hand side and S = ( j   {z})   {y}, Q =  j   {z} for the
right hand side, we get
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(h
x
e)   min
e B {y}
le(h
x,y
e )
«
 s
|B|f
 |B| > ly(hy + 1)   lz(hz) (23)
If ly(hy + 1)   lz(hz), then by (23),
0  
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(h
x
e)   min
e B {y}
le(h
x,y
e )
«
 s
|B|f
 |B| > ly(hy + 1)   lz(hz)   0, (24)
a contradiction. Therefore,
(23)   ly(hy + 1) < lz(hz). (25)
Since   is a stable strategy proﬁle,
 j( ) = Wjf
| j| +
X
A P( j)
min
e A
le(he)s
|A|f
| j| |A|
+| j|t   Wjf
| j| + | j|t (26)
+
X
C P(( j {z}) {y})
min
e C
le(h
y
e)s
|C|f
| j| |C|
=  j( 1,...,( j   {z})   {y},..., n), (27)From (26), by (15) we get
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(he)   min
e B {y}
le(h
y
e)
«
 s
|B|f
 |B|   ly(hy + 1)   lz(hz) (28)
If ly(hy + 1) < lz(hz), then by (28),
0  
X
B P( j {z})
„
min
e B {z}
le(he)   min
e B {y}
le(h
y
e)
«
 s
|B|f
 |B|   ly(hy + 1)   lz(hz) < 0, (29)
a contradiction. Therefore,
(28)   ly(hy + 1)   lz(hz), (30)
in contradiction to (25).  
By lemma 6.2, the only potential cause for non-stability
of  
  is the existence of an agent who wishes to drop service
provider emin or to exchange it for another one. Let e N
denote the set of agents who wish to make such a change
in their strategies. The algorithm selects from e N the agent
idrop := min{i
˛
˛i   e N}, and remove the service provider
emin from his strategy set. The following lemma shows that
the resulting strategy proﬁle  
   is stable. Therefore, now
the algorithm can proceed to the next iteration.
Lemma 6.3. Let      
0 and let  
  be obtained from   by
adding agent i to service provider x. If agent j  = i wants to
drop service provider x or exchange it for another one, then
the strategy proﬁle  
   obtained from  
  by removing service
provider x from the strategy  
 
j of agent j, is stable.
Proof: The case in which agent j wants to drop service
provider x is trivial. If agent j wants to deviate from x to
y, then
 j( 
 ) = Wjf
|  
j| +
X
A P(  
j)
min
e A
le(h
x
e)s
|A|f
|  
j| |A| + | 
 
j|t
> Wjf
|  
j| +
X
C P((  
j {x}) {y})
min
e C
le(h
y
e)s
|C|f
|  
j| |C|
+| j|t =  j( 
 
1,...,( 
 
j   {x})   {y},..., n), (31)
From (31), by (15) we get
X
B P( j {x})
„
min
e B {x}
le(he)   min
e B {y}
le(h
y
e)
«
 s
|B|f
 |B| > ly(hy + 1)   lx(hx + 1) (32)
  ly(hy + 1) < lx(hx + 1). (33)
It is clear that agent j does not wish to drop any SP in  
  
j ,
where  
  
j =  j  {x}. We show below that he does not wish
to move from any SP in  
  
j to an SP in E   
  
j . In contrary,
assume that j wants to deviate from ¯ v    
  
j to ¯ u   E    
  
j .
Then,
 j( 
  ) >  j( 
  
1,...,( 
  
j   {¯ v})   {¯ u},..., 
  
n). (34)
By similar arguments used before,
(34)   l¯ u(h¯ u + 1) < l¯ v(h¯ v). (35)
Since   is a stable strategy proﬁle, for all v    j and for all
u   E    j we have
 j( )    j( 1,...,( j   {v})   {u},..., n).
Then, for all v    j and for all u   E    j,
lu(hu + 1)   lv(hv). (36)
If ¯ u  = x, then (35) contradicts (36). Otherwise, by (33) and
(36),
lx(hx + 1) > l¯ v(h¯ v),
in contradiction to (35).  
Consider the k’th iteration of the algorithm, where adding
agent i
k
add to service provider e
k
min destabilizes the system.
If after adding i
k
add to e
k
min, agent i
k
drop preferred to remove
e
k
min from his strategy set, then he will not wish to add it
to his strategy at the next iteration, i.e. i
k
drop /   ¯ N
k+1.
If after adding i
k
add to e
k
min, agent i
k
drop preferred to ex-
change e
k
min to another service provider u /    ik
drop, then
lu(hu + 1) < lek
min(hek
min + 1). That is, eik
drop < e
k
min, and
therefore, at the next iteration, i
k
drop will be the unique
player in {i   ¯ N
k+1 ˛
˛ei = e
k+1
min}. Hence, at iteration (k +1)
this agent will be selected by the algorithm as i
k+1
add and will
add the service provider u to his strategy set. Thus, break-
ing exchange move into two parts does not e ect the process.
It remains to show that the TNE-algorithm halts. It is
clear that the congestion of each service provider does not
decrease as the algorithm proceeds. Therefore, in order to
prove that the algorithm terminates after ﬁnitely many it-
erations, it su ces to show that every sequence of iterations
with constant congestion is ﬁnite. This statement follows
from the following lemma:
Lemma 6.4. Let  
k represent the input of the k’th itera-
tion of the TNE-algorithm, and let h
k be the corresponding
congestion vector. Then, for every r > k such that h
r = h
k,
 
r  =  
k.
Proof: Consider agent p = i
k
add who adds service provider
e
k
min to his strategy set  
k
p at the beginning of the k’th iter-
ation. We prove below that for all r > k such that h
r = h
k
and for all e   e
k
min, e    
r
p. Then, since e
k
min /    
k
p, we get
 
r  =  
k for all such r.
In contrary, assume that agent p drops some service provider
e   e
k
min before or at the r’th iteration. Let k < s   r be
the ﬁrst iteration in which such a change occurs. Then, by
Lemma 6.2, this change is caused by adding agent q = i
s
add
to service provider e
s
min    
s
p. Let  
s+ = ( 
s
1,..., 
s
q  
{e
s
min},..., 
s
n). Since for all e   e
s
min, e    
s
p, then agent p
cannot improve his payo  by moving from e
s
min to another
SP, but only by removing e
s
min from  
s
p. Then,
 p( 
s+) >  p( 
s ), (37)
where  
s  = ( 
s+
1 ,..., 
s+
p   {e
s
min},..., 
s+
n ).
By (15) and stability of  
s,
(37)   les
min(hes
min + 1) > Wp  
t
(1   f)f| s+
p | 1. (38)Let k   l < s be the last iteration where agent p adds
an SP to his strategy set, before dropping service provider
e
s
min. Then,
 p( 
l+)    p( 
l), (39)
where  
l+ = ( 
l
1,..., 
l
p   {e
l
min},..., 
l
n).
By (15) and stability of  
l,
(39)   lel
min(hel
min + 1)   Wp  
t
(1   f)f
| l
p|. (40)
Since | 
s+
p |   | 
l
p| + 1, from (38) and (40) we have
les
min(hes
min + 1) > Wp  
t
(1   f)f| s+
p | 1
  Wp  
t
(1   f)f
| l
p|   lel
min(hel
min + 1), (41)
in contradiction to les
min(hes
min + 1)   lel
min(hel
min + 1).  
Proof of Theorem 6.1: By Lemmas 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4,
the TNE-algorithm ﬁnds a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle
in any given quasi-symmetric TCGF.  
6.2 The construction of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in symmetric TCGFs
In this subsection we consider the special case of taxed
congestion games with failures - symmetric TCGFs. In a
symmetric TCGF, the agents and the SPs are symmetric,
i.e. for all i = 1,...,n and e   E we have Wi = W,
fe = f, te = t and l
i
e(x) = l(x), for all x   {0,1,...,n}.
We present an e cient simple algorithm which easily ﬁnds
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium proﬁle in the above class
of games.
The algorithm is initialized with an empty strategy set for
each agent. It orders the set N   E = {(i,e)|i   N,e   E}
of pairs of the agents and the service providers, according to
the rule described below. According to this order, it o ers
the agents to add an SP to their strategy set. If the addi-
tion of service provider e to the strategy set  i of agent i
does not deteriorate the payo  of this agent, the algorithm
updates the strategy set of agent i and proceeds to the next
pair. The algorithm halts when it receives the ﬁrst decline.
Let us denote a(mod b) by [a]b.
6.2.1 STNE-algorithm
Initiali- For all i   N, set  i :=  ;
zation: Set k := 0;
Main 1. Set k := k + 1.
step: If k > gcd(m,n), then QUIT;
2. Set q := 1;
(a) Let eq = [q + k   1]m;
(b) If  [q]n( 1,..., [q]n   {eq},..., n)
   [q]n( ), then set
 [q]n :=  [q]n   {eq};
Otherwise, QUIT;
(c) Set q := q + 1. If q > lcm(m,n),
then go to 1. Otherwise, go to (a).
The procedure of ordering the set N  E is illustrated by
the following example. Suppose we have n = 9 agents and
m = 6 service providers. We deﬁne an order in which we
o er the agents to add an SP to their strategy set in the
following way.
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8
9
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 1
2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
We assign the agents to SPs, beginning from the agent 1
assigned to service provider 1, agent 2 assigned to service
provider 2, and so on. Agent 6 is assigned to the last service
provider; then agent 7 goes to service provider 1. The last
agent gets service provider 3, and we continue with assign-
ing agent 1 to service provider 4. At the end of the ﬁrst
iteration, agent 9 is assigned to service provider 6. At the
next iteration we move the agents by one step; that is, agent
1 is assigned to service provider 2, agent 2 is assigned to ser-
vice provider 3, and at the end of the iteration, agent 9 is
assigned to service provider 1. The length of each iteration
is bounded by the least common multiplier of m and n, and
the number of iterations is bounded by the greatest common
divider of m and n.
Theorem 6.5. The STNE-algorithm ﬁnds a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in a given symmetric TCGF.
7. DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper we studied congestion games in which facil-
ities may fail to complete their assigned tasks. We have
shown that these games do not admit a potential func-
tion, and therefore are not isomorphic to classic congestion
games. However, we were able to prove the existence of
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for these games, and to ﬁnd
an e cient algorithm for its construction. We also showed
that the congestion experienced by each of the facilities in
di erent Nash equilibria is (almost) unique. For symmetric
BCGFs we provided a characterization of the best and worst
Nash equilibria, presented algorithms for their construction,
and made a comparison of agents’ payo s at these equilib-
rium points. We deﬁned a model for taxed congestion games
with failures and proved the existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in quasi-symmetric TCGFs. We also pro-
vided an e cient algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium
in symmetric TCGFs.
Since it is known that Nash equilibria do not optimize the
overall welfare, the social performance of Nash equilibria
should be studied. In this context, we outline the follow-
ing two directions: (i) evaluation of the ine ciency of Nash
equilibria; (ii) developing methods for improving the out-
come of Nash equilibria. In both directions we have some
partial results for the games presented in this paper. For
instance, the price of anarchy in BCGFs is a function of the
parameters of the game and cannot be bounded by constant
value, even for very simple (e.g., linear) cost functions. Theine ciency of Nash equilibria motivates the study of meth-
ods for improving the social outcome obtained by selﬁsh
agents. In this context, we have some positive results (that
were omitted from this paper) showing that economic in-
centives, e.g. taxation, can improve the outcome of Nash
equilibria in congestion games with failures. That is, we can
price the facilities to reduce the total social disutility of Nash
equilibrium - the sum of the agents’ disutilities plus taxes
paid. We are interested in formulating meaningful condi-
tions under which taxes can reduce the total cost of Nash
equilibrium in games with failures.
As part of our research we plan to take further look at the
modelling of noncooperative games with failures. The mod-
els we presented here could be extended or modiﬁed. In par-
ticular, the facility failures might be congestion-dependent
or unknown to the agents.
Overall, we believe this work tackles a fundamental con-
nection between distributed computing and game theory.
While congestion is substantial to both disciplines (and in-
deed is extensively studied by both communities), the notion
of selﬁsh behavior pertains to game theory and the notion
of failures originates from distributed computing. However,
there is a natural connection between these topics which to
the best of our knowledge is ﬁrst explored in this work.
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